Many studies have identified a line of influence between interest group lobbying and the federal bureaucracy's implementation of public policy. These works, however, have often focused on the influence of individual groups rather than coalitional efforts, which compose the majority of lobbying. Assessing this activity is critical to understanding the role of public participants in administrative policymaking. I test the influence of diverse coalitions of interest groups on bureaucratic policy outputs by analyzing a new dataset of organizations' co-signed public comments across nearly 350 federal agency rules proposed between 2005 and 2015. I conclude that diverse lobbying coalitions help bureaucrats to shape the direction and content of regulatory law. This conclusion further establishes the role of organizational participants in bureaucratic policymaking and contributes to the debate over democratic legitimacy in the administrative state.

Maraam Dwidar an Assistant Professor of Political Science in the Maxwell School. Her research focuses on American national institutions and public policy, with emphases on minority representation, organized interests, and bureaucratic politics.